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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF : 
HUMAN SERVICES. OFFICE OF RECOVERY 
SERVICES. and CHILD SUPPORT : 
ENFORCEMENT, 
Plaintiffs and Appellant 
and Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 930804-CA 
REYES VALENTINO CORDOVA, : Priority 15 
Defendant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT ORS 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this appeal is conferred by Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(d) (Supp. 1993). 
STATUTES INVOLVED 
The following statutes and rules are relevant to the 
determination of this appeal: Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-7 (Supp. 
1993); Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(4) (1992); Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-6 
(1992); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45-8, -9 (1992); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-
45a-2, -5 (1992); Utah Code Ann. § 62A-9-121 (1989); and Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1993). The full text of these provisions is 
set forth as Addendum A. 
ISSUE PRESENTED/STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Does a circuit court have subject matter jurisdiction of an 
independent civil action to collect past due child support ordered 
by a district court in a divorce, support, or paternity action? 
This issue presents a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness with no deference accorded to the trial court's 
determination. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. Co., 851 
P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1993); Rimensburger v. Rimensburaer. 
841 P.2d 709, 710 (Utah App. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
This civil action was filed in the Third Circuit Court, West 
Valley Department, by Child Support Enforcement, a private 
collection agency, to collect past due child support1 from 
defendant Cordova. R. 9-10. The defendant is a noncustodial 
natural parent whose monthly child support obligation was fixed and 
ordered by a Utah district court judge in June 1989 in a paternity 
proceeding. R. 13-15. 
At CSE's request, appellant Office of Recovery Services 
("ORS") was ordered joined as a party plaintiff pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45-9(2) (1992) because the custodial parent, CSE's 
purported assignor, had received public assistance from the State 
of Utah.2 R. 69-70 (Order, attached as Addendum B) . ORS had 
xThe complaint sought less than the circuit court 
jurisdictional cap of $20,000. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-7 (Supp. 
1993) . 
2The statute provides: 
(2) (a) A person may not commence any action or file a 
pleading to establish or modify a support obligation or 
to recover support due or owing, whether under this 
chapter or any other applicable statute, without filing 
an affidavit with the court at the time the action is 
commenced or the pleading is filed stating whether public 
assistance has been or is being provided on behalf of a 
dependent child of the person commencing the action or 
filing the pleading. 
2 
opposed compulsory joinder on the basis that the circuit court has 
no subject matter jurisdiction to enforce a claim for past due 
child support ordered by a district court. R. 27-38. 
The Honorable William A. Thorne rejected this argument, 
concluding that the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction 
over actions to enforce district court orders for child support 
once payment is past due. R. 61-68 (Decision, attached as Addendum 
C) . He concluded that once a district court-ordered child support 
payment is past due, it changes from a child support obligation 
into a "debt" owed by the noncustodial parent. Such a debt, he 
reasoned, can be sued on in an independent civil action in the 
circuit court just like any other debt, as long as the amount 
claimed is below the circuit court's monetary jurisdictional 
ceiling. R. 64-65; Addendum C at 4-5. The circuit court can enter 
a money judgment in this debt action; however, relying in part on 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(4) (1992),3 Judge Thorne concluded that the 
circuit court lacks the power to enforce a district court's child 
support order through the use of contempt orders. R. 63-64; 
Addendum C at 3-4. 
Following involuntary joinder of ORS, a $13,866 money judgment 
was entered in the Third Circuit Court in favor of CSE and against 
defendant Cordova for past due child support payments, accrued 
(b) If public assistance has been or is being provided, 
that person shall join the [Office of Recovery Services] 
as a party to the action. 
3This statute gives every court the authority to "compel 
obedience to its judgments, orders, and process. . . in a pending 
action or proceeding." (Emphasis added). 
3 
interest, and court costs. R. 110. 
ORS timely appealed from the judgment in order to obtain from 
this Court a resolution of the important jurisdictional question.4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Legislature has expressly barred the circuit courts 
from considering claims for unpaid child support that arise from a 
district court's order in a divorce, support, or paternity action. 
Those actions are wisely centralized by the legislature under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the district courts, which have 
continuing jurisdiction to oversee the collection of past due child 
support that they have originally ordered after taking into account 
all the circumstances of the parties. 
In this case, the circuit court erroneously concluded that 
once payment is past due, a claim for monthly child support is 
severed from the original district court action from which the 
support order arose, becoming instead a generic "debt" to the 
custodial parent. Such a debt can be sued on in an independent 
civil action in circuit court, according to the circuit court, if 
the total claim is less than that court's monetary jurisdictional 
cap. A money judgment is available in the circuit court action; 
40ther ORS appeals from the same ruling by Circuit Court 
Edward Watson on the jurisdictional issue are currently pending 
before this court as State of Utah, Dep't of Human Services, Office 
of Recovery Services and Child Support Enforcement v. Lee Allen 
Richards et al.. No. 930654-CA. 
The separate, but related, issue of whether the custodial 
parent's right to enforce a district court's child support order 
can be assigned to a third party other than ORS is already before 
this Court in State ex. rel. Parker v. Ferran, No. 930033-CA, 
currently on temporary remand to district court for entry of 
findings and conclusions. 
4 
however, contempt is not available in circuit court to compel 
compliance with the district court's child support order. 
This Court should reject the trial court's conclusion on both 
statutory and public policy grounds. A claim for child support 
that arises from a prior district court support order does not lose 
its nature as such the moment it becomes past due. The subject 
matter of the action is still child support originally ordered by 
a district court, over which only the district courts have 
jurisdiction under Utah law. 
In addition to being prohibited by Utah's statutory scheme, 
the splintering of a continuing claim for monthly, district court-
ordered child support into multiple causes of action in multiple 
courts and court systems would be contrary to sensible public 
policy. It would increase the costs of child support litigation 
for all parties, including the State, waste judicial resources, and 
add confusion to the collection process, further thwarting all 
efforts to assure that natural parents financially provide for 
their children. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH LAW VESTS THE DISTRICT COURT WITH 
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS FOR PAST 
DUE CHILD SUPPORT ORDERED BY A DISTRICT COURT, 
AND IT EXPRESSLY PROHIBITS THE CIRCUIT COURT 
FROM EXERCISING JURISDICTION OVER SUCH CLAIMS. 
The jurisdictional limits of a statutorily-created court, such 
as the circuit court, are circumscribed by its empowering 
legislation. R. v. Whitmer In and For Salt Lake County, 30 Utah 2d 
206, 515 P.2d 617 (1973); Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 
I 
(Utah App. 1987) . Without jurisdiction over the subject matter, a 
court is without authority to proceed to the merits of a 
controversy, and any judgment or order entered by that court is 
null and void. Thompson, 743 P.2d at 1232; Van Per Stappen v. Van 
Per Stappen. 815 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah App. 1991) . 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (1992), the district 
court has broad "original jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited 
by law." Accord Herzoa v. Bramwell. 82 Utah 216, 23 P.2d 345, 348 
(1933). No such broad authority has been conferred, by Utah's 
Constitution or statutes, upon the circuit courts. On the 
contrary, the Utah Legislature has substantially restricted, by 
subject matter as well as by amount in controversy, the circuit 
court's authority to entertain civil actions: 
The circuit court has civil jurisdiction, both law and 
equity, in all matters if the sum claimed in less than 
$20,000 . . . except: 
(2) in actions of divorce, child custody, and paternity; 
. . . and 
(6) in all other actions, where, by statute, jurisdiction 
is exclusively vested in the district court or other 
trial or appellate court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-7 (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added). 
Further demonstrating the clear legislative intent to withhold 
from circuit courts any authority to consider child support claims 
regardless of amount, every statute relating to the imposition of 
or enforcement of a parent's obligation to support his or her child 
vests exclusive subject matter jurisdiction in the district court. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-1 to -37 (provision of statute regulating 
6 
divorce proceedings, section 30-3-5, gives district court authority 
to enter orders relating to child support as well as continuing 
jurisdiction to modify such orders); Uniform Civil Liability for 
Support Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45-1 to -12 (section 78-45-6 
grants district court jurisdiction of all proceedings brought under 
this act) ; Uniform Act on Paternity, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45a-l to 
-17 (under section 78-45a-5(l), district court has jurisdiction of 
an action to establish paternity and power to enforce a judgment 
for child support, with continuing jurisdiction to modify or revoke 
such judgment) ; Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 77-31-1 to -39 (section 77-31-10 vests jurisdiction of 
all proceedings under this act in the district court) ; see also 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6 (1) (a) (Supp. 1993) (each payment under 
a child support order is, on and after the date due, "a judgment 
with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of a district 
court"); Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(4) (1992) (each court has 
authority to enforce its own judgments and orders in a pending 
case); Public Support of Children Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-11-301 
to -504 (1993) (authorizing enforcement of ORS's administrative 
support order, under section 62A-11-311(1), by filing an abstract 
of it "with the clerk of any district court in the state"). 
Thus, section 78-4-7(2) expressly prohibits the circuit court 
from exercising jurisdiction over claims that arise from actions 
for divorce or paternity, which are different vehicles for securing 
court orders that mandate payment of child support by natural 
7 
parents.5 In addition, the other statutes cited affirmatively 
place exclusive jurisdiction over claims for child support in the 
district courts--whether they arise there in the context of 
divorce, support, or paternity proceedings--thereby creating 
another insurmountable bar to circuit court jurisdiction over such 
claims by virtue of section 78-4-7(6), 
II. A CLAIM FOR RECOVERY OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS 
ORDERED BY A DISTRICT COURT DOES NOT--FOR 
PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE CIRCUIT COURT'S 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION--CEASE BEING PART 
OF THAT DISTRICT COURT ACTION ONCE THE 
PAYMENTS BECOME PAST DUE. 
Notwithstanding this comprehensive statutory scheme for 
handling child support matters only in the district courts,6 the 
circuit court determined it could concurrently exercise a limited 
form of subject matter jurisdiction over some claims for child 
support by distinguishing between future and past due child 
support. The court ignored the plain language of both exceptions 
to circuit court jurisdiction in section 78-4-7 by erroneously 
characterizing district court-ordered child support payments--once 
5Utah's prohibition of circuit courts from enforcing child 
support orders, or other financial obligations arising from a 
divorce or paternity action, is apparently typical. See 67A C.J.S. 
Parent and Child § 80 at 402 (1978) (absent statutory 
authorization, courts of limited jurisdiction may not enforce 
provisions of separation agreements, divorce decrees, or judgments 
of paternity and may not compel payment of child support or grant 
money judgments for past support expenditures). 
*CSE has agreed before this Court that the statutes give 
district court sole subject matter jurisdiction over claims for 
past due child support. Brief of Appellant CSE at 22-25, State ex 
rel. Parker v. Ferran, 930033-CA; see note 4, supra. CSE 
nonetheless continues to argue the opposite view in the circuit 
court. R. 98; Addendum C at 5. 
8 
past due--as no longer part of the district court divorce or 
paternity action in which the child support orders were entered. 
R. 64; Addendum C at 4. Instead, monthly child support payments 
transform on their due dates from child support claims into 
ordinary "debts" for a fixed amount, collectable in a circuit court 
action like any other contractual debt, as long as the sum claimed 
is less than the circuit court's monetary jurisdictional ceiling. 
R. 65; Addendum C at 5.7 
The sole basis for this transmogrification of the child 
support obligation is the following language in Bagcrs v. Anderson, 
528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974) (emphasis added): 
[S]upport money can fall into two separate categories: 
First, the current and ongoing right of a child to 
receive support money from his father (parent); and 
second, the right to receive reimbursement for support of 
a child after that has been done. As to the second, 
suppose a father (parent) fails over a period of time to 
furnish support of the child, and the mother, or someone 
else furnishes it. That person then has a right to claim 
reimbursement from the parent, the same as any other past 
debt. This right of reimbursement belongs to whoever 
fsicl furnished the support; and it is subject to 
negotiation, settlement, satisfaction or discharge in the 
same manner as any other debt. 
See R. 65; Addendum C at 5. This dicta does not support the 
circuit court's ruling on the jurisdictional issue here. As is 
evident from the complaint filed in the instant case, this is not 
an independent action for reimbursement of past support supplied. 
This is an action seeking to enforce a district court's support 
order that inextricably remains part of the original paternity 
7The parties would, in Judge Thome's view, have to return to 
the original district court action to enforce the child support 
obligation through a contempt proceeding. R. 63; Addendum C at 3. 
9 
proceeding, over which the district court has original and 
continuing jurisdiction and power to compel compliance with its 
orders. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-5(l) (Supp. 1993); Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-7-5(4) (1992) . 
The characterization of unpaid, district court-ordered child 
support as a "debt" owed to a support provider is irrelevant to 
resolution of the jurisdictional issue. Describing accrued child 
support as a debt does not change the fact that the subject matter 
of an action on such a debt is child support ordered by a district 
court, a matter over which section 78-4-7 precludes the circuit 
court from exercising any jurisdiction.8 
In Herzocr, 23 P.2d at 347-48, the Utah Supreme Court held in 
a mandamus action that the district court must assume jurisdiction 
over a petition to enforce the alimony payment terms of a prior 
district court divorce decree, even though resolution of the 
petition would require the district court to rule on the validity 
of the parties' purported post-decree contractual settlement of 
those past due alimony claims. "[A] district court, having 
acquired jurisdiction of subject-matter and of the parties, has 
jurisdiction in the same action of all disputes and controversies 
presented by the pleadings arising out of or connected with the 
same subject-matter of the action." Id. at 348; accord Emrich v. 
McNeil, 126 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (district court's 
eThe Public Support of Children Act, which authorizes ORS to 
enter administrative judgments for past due child support and then 
abstract them in the district court, likewise uses the term 
"support debt" to mean "the debt created by nonpayment of support." 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A 11-303(19) (1993). 
10 
jurisdiction over parties' prior divorce continued so that it, not 
inferior court, had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate 
subsequent child support claim). 
This Court should similarly hold that child support claims 
arising out of or connected with original paternity, support, or 
divorce proceedings in district court must, under Utah's statutory 
scheme, be settled in the context of the prior judicial action in 
district court, not in an independent action in circuit court. The 
circuit court's intervention order and judgment should, 
accordingly, be vacated as null and void. 
This result is compelled by serious practical and public 
policy concerns as well as by the cited statutes. The ruling of 
the circuit court in the instant case hopelessly fractionalizes a 
single domestic proceeding for paternity in one district court into 
multiple causes of action that can be filed in numerous circuit 
courts. Under Judge Thome's reasoning, each past due monthly 
payment of court-ordered support during a child's years of minority 
can be a separate debt action in a circuit court, filed by the 
custodial parent and/or by ORS.9 (On the other hand, either the 
custodial parent or ORS may elect to accumulate claims for more 
than $20,000 in support arrearages, in which case Judge Thome's 
ruling would apparently require the filing of a new, independent 
9Utah law grants ORS standing, independent of the custodial 
parent's, to enforce the right to child support as an initiating or 
intervening party in a divorce, support, or paternity proceeding 
against the support obligor. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-9 (1992) ; id. , 
§ 78-45a-2 (1992); Ad^, § 78-45a-5 (Supp. 1993); i£^ § 62A-11-104 
(1993) . 
11 
"debt" action in district court, not circuit court.) However, if 
the custodial parent or ORS wants a court to hold the obligor in 
contempt for failure to pay child support, s/he or ORS must go back 
to the original action in district court. 
This fractionalization of what is, essentially, a single—but 
ongoing--cause of action for child support is nonsensical. It also 
needlessly increases the costs of support litigation for the 
parties, including both parents and ORS, who must appear and 
respond in two (or more) separate forums in multiple lawsuits. 
Permitting a new and separate action in circuit court to enforce a 
district court's prior order, in contravention of section 78-7-
5(4), also wastes public judicial resources through duplicative 
filings in separate courts and court systems. 
Other practical considerations militate against recognizing 
any concurrent jurisdiction in the circuit court over child support 
matters. For example, support obligors (or their garnishees) would 
be subject to multiple, potentially overlapping post-judgment 
garnishment or attachment orders or judgment liens emanating from 
two different court systems. There is no method for reconciling 
any such circuit court judgments and post-judgment judicial 
remedies relating to past-due support with those entered in the 
original district court action or with those abstracted in district 
court as ORS's administrative child support orders. Thus, it will 
be nearly impossible for either court, or for ORS, the custodial 
parent, or the support obligor to keep track accurately of what 
months of support have been reduced to a court judgment or a court-
12 
abstracted agency order, as well as what months of arrearages have 
or have not been paid up. This chaos will, in turn, further 
handicap efforts to collect child support from delinquent parents. 
Just as importantly, a district court in a divorce, support, 
or paternity action, in exercise of its continuing jurisdiction and 
its power to enforce its own judgments or orders, must be able to 
enter judgments for support arrearages and subsequent equitable 
orders concerning execution on those judgments after taking a 
holistic view of the parties' obligations, duties, interests, and 
resources. For example, a district court may stay execution on its 
judgment for past due support as long as an obligor of limited 
means timely pays ongoing child support plus an extra amount each 
month toward the arrearages. Harmon v. Harmon, 26 Utah 2d 436, 491 
P.2d 231 (1971) (district court exercising continuing jurisdiction 
in divorce action has discretion to restrict execution on judgments 
for support arrearages to prevent the destruction of the means for 
payment of ongoing support). Similar authority and flexibility is 
given to the district court in support and paternity actions. Utah 
Code Ann, § 78-45-8 (1992) (under Uniform Civil Liability for 
Support Act, district court retains jurisdiction to modify or 
vacate orders of support "where justice requires"); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45a-5(l) (Supp. 1993) (under Uniform Act on Paternity, 
district court has continuing jurisdiction "to modify or revoke a 
judgment for . . . necessary support")• 
If an obligee is permitted to obtain from circuit court a 
rubber-stamped judgment for an excised period of past due child 
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support, the district courts in the original proceedings will lose 
this essential flexibility. They will, in effect, be divested of 
their statutory powers to make equitable orders regarding support 
of a child and to compel compliance with their own judgments or 
orders in pending cases. 
In light of such realities, the appellate court in Emrich 
sagely determined that sound public policy required a district 
court with original jurisdiction over a parties7 divorce--not an 
inferior municipal court in an independent action--to resolve all 
post-decree child support claims. 126 F.2d at 844. In reaching 
this conclusion, the court aptly noted, "No advantage to the 
parents, to the minor child, or to the well being of the people of 
the District could be accomplished by permitting such splitting up 
of issues . . . ." Id. at 845. 
In sum, the circuit court's exercise of limited, concurrent 
jurisdiction over child support collection in Utah would be 
contrary to current law and would constitute undesirable public 
policy that would further hinder recovery of support from natural 
parents, adding confusion and cost to an already complicated area. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, ORS requests that this Court vacate 
as null and void the final judgment and intervention order appealed 
from, and remand this case to the Third Circuit Court with 
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instructions that the complaint be dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
Respectfully submitted this $£U day of April 1994. 
BILLY WALKER (3358) 
ANNINA M. MITCHELL (2274) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorneys for ORS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, with first-class 
postage prepaid, two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant ORS 
to each of the following persons, this 1&tL day of April 1994: 
Michael Barker 
Attorney for Appellee CSE 
#112 Metropolitan Law Bldg. 
431 South 300 Ea8t 
Salt Lake City, \JT 84111 
Reyes Cordova 
1516 Concord 
Salt Lake City, \JT 84104 
Craig Cook 
Attorney for Appellee CSE 
3645 East 3100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
^L^^( ^ 6^AXV 
15 
ADDENDUM A: Text of Relevant Statutes 
co o c o c < 
C € - C C # 
> O C C C ( l l crcc-» 
G O G C C C I 
G « C C C t 
" C C C C . 3 I 
" O f G O O C I 
78-4-7 JUDICIAL CODE 
< 
otooocl 
I OOGGOf 
CIGCCi 
C O C G C O I 
C I C O C O 
i O CO-CO 
ctecci 
Hialory: C. 1»53,7*3*103, «n»ctod by L. 
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repealed April 1, 1995. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 173, « 6 
makes the act effective on July 1, 1993. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CIRCUIT COURTS 
Section 
78-4-7. 
784-11. 
Civil jurisdiction — .Exceptions. 
Appeals to Court of Appeals — 
Prosecuting attorney to repre-
sent state — City attorney to 
represent municipality. 
Section 
784-19. 
78-4-23. 
784-24. 
Repealed. 
Remission of monies collected. 
Repealed. 
78-4-7. Civil jurisdiction — Exceptions. 
The circuit court has civil jurisdiction, both law and equity, in all matters if 
the sum claimed is less than $20,000, exclusive of court costs, interest, and 
attorney fees, except: 
(1) in actions to determine the title to real property, but not excluding 
actions to foreclose mechanics liens; 
(2) in actions of divorce, child custody, and paternity; 
(3) in actions under the Utah Uniform Probate Code; 
(4) in actions to review the decisions of any state administrative 
agency, board, council, commission, or hearing officer; 
(5) in actions seeking remedies in the form of extraordinary writs; and 
(6) in all other actions where, by statute, jurisdiction is exclusively 
vested in the district court or other trial or appellate court. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27,1992, inserted "inter-
est, and attorney fees** in the undesignated in-
troductory language. 
78*4-11. Appeals to Court of Appeals — Prosecuting attor-
ney to represent state — City attorney to repre-
sent municipality. 
Except as otherwise directed by Section 78-2*2, appeals from final civil and 
criminal judgments of the circuit courts are to the Court of Appeals. The 
county attorney or district attorney as provided under Sections 17-18-1 and 
17-18-1.7 shall represent the interests of the state as public prosecutor in any 
appeals of criminal matters prosecuted by the county attorney in the circuit 
court. City attorneys shall represent the interests of the state in any appeals 
of criminal matters prosecuted by the city attorney and the interests of munic-
ipalities in any appeals involving violations of municipal ordinances. 
History: C. 1953, 784-7, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 77,1 1? 1983, ch. 76,1 1; 1986, ch. 
121, I 1; 1988, ch. 248,1 81; 1991, ch. 368, 
I SI; 1992, ch. 127, I IS. 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO COURTS AND JUDGES 78-7-5 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 36. oppose, order closing criminal proceedings to 
C.J.S. - 21 CJ.S. Courts § 121. Pu^ic, 74 AXJUth 476. 
ATT> r < i r ^ * x _ i . i x. / • • . Prejudicial effect of improper failure to ex-
A.L.R. - Effect of ^ toess violation of order
 d u d e {rom C0UTtT00m o r to sequester or sepa-
of exclusion, 14 A.L.R.3d 16.
 n t e g^^'s witnesses in criminal case, 74 
Standing of media representatives or organi- A.L.R.4th 705. 
zations to seek review of, or to intervene to Key Numbers. — Courts *» 79. 
78-7-5. Powers of every court. 
Every court has authority to: 
(1) preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence; 
(2) enforce order in the proceedings before it, or before a person autho-
rized to conduct a judicial investigation under its authority; 
(3) provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it or its offi-
cers; 
(4) compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process, and to the 
orders of a judge out of court, in a pending action or proceeding; 
(5) control in furtherance of justice the conduct of its ministerial offi-
cers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial 
proceeding before it in every matter; 
(6) compel the attendance of persons to testify in a pending action or 
proceeding, as provided by law; 
(7) administer oaths in a pending action or proceeding, and in all other 
cases where necessary in the exercise of its authority and duties; 
(8) amend and control its process and orders to conform to law and 
justice; 
(9) devise and make new process and forms of proceedings, consistent 
with law, necessary to carry into effect its authority and jurisdiction; and 
(10) enforce rules of the Supreme Court and Judicial Council. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 68, I 1; C. 1943, Cross-References. — Acknowledgments, 
Supp., 104-7-5; L. 1988, ch. 248, $ 41. power to take, § 57-2a-3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- Contempt generally, § 78-32-1 et seq. 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, added Subsec- Power to solemnize marriages, § 30-1-6. 
tion (10) and made minor stylistic changes Subpoenas, §§ 78-24-4 to 78-24-6. 
throughout. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Vacating orders. and cannot be vacated by the order of another 
Order of district court finding mother in con- district judge nine years later. Peterson v. Pe-
tempt and suspending child support is valid tenon, 530 P.2d 821 (Utah 1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts f 64 ing or pending trial as ground for contempt 
et seq. proceedings or other disciplinary measures 
C.J.S. — 17 CJ.S. Contempt § 43. against member of the bar, 11 A.L.R.3d 1104. 
AX.R. — Interference with enforcement of Appealability of acquittal from or dismissal 
judgment in criminal or juvenile delinquent ofchargeofcontemptofcourt,24 A.L.R.3d650. 
case as contempt, 8 A.L.R.3d 657. Appealability of contempt adjudication or 
Release of information concerning forthcom- conviction, 33 AX.R.3d 448. 
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78-45-5 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-45-5. Duty of obligor regardless of presence or resi-
dence of obligee. 
An obligor present or resident in this state has the duty of support as 
defined in this act regardless of the presence or residence of the obligee. 
History: L. 1957, ch- 110, | 5. 
Meaning of "ihiB act" — See note under 
same catchlinc following t 76-45-1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Desertion Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife *» 4; 
and Nonsupport S§ 32, 95. Parent and Child •» 3.1(5). 
78-45-6. District court jurisdiction. 
The district court shall have jurisdiction of all proceedings brought under 
this act. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, I 6. Meaning of "this act" — See note under 
Cross-References. — General jurisdiction same catchline following I 78-45-1. 
of district court, S 76-3-4. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. —20 Am. Jur. 2d Court* 5 147 
et seq. 
Key Numbers. — Courts *» 156. 
78-45-7. Determination of amount of support — Rebutta-
ble guidelines. 
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior court 
order unless there has been a material change of circumstance on the part of 
the obligor or obligee. 
(2) If no prior court order exists, or a material change in circumstances has 
occurred, the court determining the amount of prospective support shall re-
quire each party to file a proposed award of child support using the guidelines 
before an order awarding .child support or modifying an existing award may 
be granted. 
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court 
shall establish support after considering all relevant factors, including but not 
limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; 
(f) the ages of the parties; and 
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of 
others. 
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UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT 78-45-9 
78*45-8. Continuing jurisdiction. 
The court shall retain jurisdiction to modify or vacate the order of support 
where justice requires. 
History: L. 1957, eh. 110, I 8. 
Cross-References. — General jurisdiction 
of district court, i 78-3-4. 
78-45-9. Enforcement of right of support. 
(1) (a) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor, and 
the office may proceed pursuant to this chapter or any other applicable 
statute, either on behalf of the Department of Human Services or any 
other department or agency of this state that provides public assistance, 
as defined by Subsection 62A-11-303C3), to enforce the right to recover 
public assistance, or on behalf of the obligee, to enforce the obligee's right 
of support against the obligor. 
(b) Whenever any court action is commenced by the office to enforce 
payment of the obligor's support obligation, it shall be the duty of the 
attorney general or the county attorney of the county of residence of the 
obligee to represent the office. 
(2) (a) A person may not commence any action or file a pleading to estab-
lish or modify a support obligation or to recover support due or owing, 
whether under this chapter or any other applicable statute, without filing 
an affidavit with the court at the time the action is commenced or the 
pleading is filed stating whether public assistance has been or is being 
provided on behalf of a dependent child of the person commencing the 
action or filing the pleading. 
(b) If public assistance has been or is being provided, that person shall 
join the office as a party to the action. The office shall be represented as 
provided in Subsection (l)(b). 
(3) As used in this section "office" means the Office of Recovery Services 
within the Department of Human Services. 
History: L. 1957, ch, 110, f 9; 1975, ch, 96, owing that obligee whether under this act or 
§ 23; 1977, ch, 145, S 11; 1982, ch, 63, t 2; any other applicable statute without first filing 
19S9, ch, 62, I 23; 1990, ch, 1S3, I 59. an affidavit with the court at the time the ac-
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- tion is commenced stating whether that obli-
ment, effective April 24, 1989, designated the gee has received public assistance from any 
first sentence of Subsection (1) as QXa) and source"; designated the second and third sen-
rewrote the provision which read: "The obligee fences of Subsection (2) as (2Kb) and rewrote 
may enforce his right of support against the the provision which read: I f the obligee has 
obligor and the ftate Department of Social Ser- received public assistance, the obligee shall 
vices may proceed pursuant to this act or any join the Department of Social Services as a 
other applicable statute, either on its behalf or party plaintiff in the action. The Department 
on behalf of the obligee to enforce the obligee's of Social Services shall be represented as pro-
right of support against the obligor"; desig- vided in Subsection (1) of this section"; and 
nated the second sentence of Subsection (1) as added Subsection (3). 
(1Kb) and substituted "office" for "state depart- The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 
ment of social services" and "the office" lor 1990, substituted "Human Services" for "Social 
"that department" therein; designated the first Services" in Subsections QXa) and (3). 
sentence of Subsection (2) as (2Xa) and rewrote Cross-References, — Enforcement of sup-
the provision which read: "No obligee shall port provisions by Department of Human Ser-
commence any action to recover support due or vices, § 62A-1-111. 
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UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 78-45a-2 
78-45a-2. Enforcement. 
Paternity may be determined upon the petition of the mother, child, puta-
tive father, or the public authority chargeable by law with the support of the 
child. If paternity has been determined or has been acknowledged according to 
the laws of this state, the liabilities of the father may be enforced in the same 
or other proceedings: 
(1) by the mother, child, or the public authority that has furnished or 
may furnish the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, educa-
tion, necessary support, or funeral expenses; and 
(2) by other persons including private agencies to the extent that they 
have furnished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, edu-
cation, necessary support, or funeral expenses. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, f 2; 1990, ch. 
245, t 23. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23,1990, inserted "puta-
tive father" in the first sentence and made 
minor stylistic changes. 
Cross-References. — Enforcement of provi-
ANALYSIS 
Estoppel and laches. 
Evidence. 
—Conception and birth. 
Right to counsel. 
—Indigent prisoners. 
Blood tests. 
Discretion of court. 
Standard of proof. 
—Preponderance of evidence. 
Estoppel and laches. 
Under appropriate circumstances, laches 
may bar an action for paternity. Borland v. 
Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987). 
A paternity action brought six years after 
the birth of the child was not barred by laches, 
where defendant made no factual showing to 
support his argument that he was prejudiced 
by the delay. Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 
144 (Utah 1987). 
Evidence. 
—Conception and birth. 
Where child was conceived while mother was 
married to her first husband and born while 
she was married to her second husband, the 
child was legitimate whichever husband was 
the father, and testimony by mother that dis-
puted second husband's fatherhood and sup-
ported first husband's fatherhood would not 
illegitimize the child and was properly admis-
sible in paternity action against first husband. 
Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 (Utah 1982). 
aions by Department of Human Services, 
(-62A-MU. 
Office of Recovery Services to perform duties 
of Department of Human Services in collecting 
child support, § 62A-11-104. 
Public support of children, §§ 62A-11-301 to 
62A-11-332. 
Right to counsel 
—Indigent prisoners. 
Blood tests. 
While due process does not require Utah to 
appoint counsel for all indigent prisoners who 
are defendants in paternity cases, there may be 
some complicated paternity suits in which the 
risks of error would be high enough that the 
presumption against the right to appointed 
counsel would be overcome; given the avail-
ability and quality of the blood tests, there is 
no need for appointment of counsel prior to the 
time the tests are given. Nordgren v. Mitchell, 
716 FM 1335 (10th Cir. 1983). 
——Discretion of court 
Due process of law does not require that all 
indigent, incarcerated defendants in paternity 
actions must always be appointed counsel; 
whether due process requires the appointment 
of counsel in such cases is vested in the discre-
tion of the trial court Nordgren v. Mitchell, 
624 F. Supp. 242 (D. Utah 1981), aflTd, 716 F.2d 
1335 (10th Cir. 1983). 
Standard of proof. 
—Preponderance of evidence. 
The applicable standard of proof where pa-
ternity is asserted is "by a preponderance of 
the evidence." Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 
(Utah 1982). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ess 
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 78-45a-5 
78-45a-5. Remedies. 
(1) The district court has jurisdiction of an action under this act and all 
remedies for the enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and 
confinement for a wife or for education, necessary support, or funeral expenses 
for legitimate children apply. The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify 
or revoke a judgment for future education and necessary support. All reme-
dies under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, are available 
for enforcement of duties of support under this act. 
(2) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor and the 
state Department of Human Services may proceed on behalf of the obligee or 
in its own behalf pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 45b of this title to 
enforce that right of support against the obligor. In such actions by the depart-
ment, all the provisions of Chapter 45b of this title shall be equally applicable 
to this chapter. Whenever a court action is commenced by the state Depart-
ment of Human Services, it shall be the duty of the attorney general or the 
county attorney, of the county of residence of the obligee, to represent that 
department. 
History: L-1965, ch. 158,1 5; 1975, ch. 96, 
§ 24; 1990, ch. 183, ft 60. 
Amendment Notes, — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted 
"Human Services" for "Social Services" twice 
in Subsection (2). 
Meaning of ,tthii act" — See note under 
same catchline following { 78-45a-4. 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act — The Uniform Reciprocal En* 
forcement of Support Act, referred to in the 
last sentence in Subsection (1), is Chapter 31 of 
Title 77. 
Interests of mother and state. 
Jurisdiction. 
—Minority of putative father. 
Powers of the court. 
Interests of mother and state. 
In an action pursuant to the Uniform Act on 
Paternity, the state has a separate interest 
from that of the mother. The state and the 
mother are not in privity because each has sep-
arate interests and legal rights over which the 
other has no control. State ex rel. State Dept of 
Social Servs. v. Ruscetta, 742 P.2d 114 (Utah 
Ct App. 1987). 
Compiler's Notes. — Chapter 45b of this 
title, referred to in Subsection (2), was repealed 
by Laws 1988, ch. 1, $ 407. For present compa-
rable provisions, see 15 62A-11-301 through 
62A-11-328. 
Cross-References. — Creation of Depart-
ment of Human Services, ( 62A-1-102. 
General duties of attorney general, § 67*5-1. 
General duties of county attorney, § 17*18-1. 
General jurisdiction of district court, 
I 78-3-4. 
—Minority of putative father. 
District court, and not the juvenile court, has 
jurisdiction over action brought under the Uni-
form Act on Paternity, when the putative fa-
ther is a minor. State ex rel. Utah State Dep*t 
of Social Servs. v. Dick, 684 ?M 42 (Utah 
1984). 
Powers of the court 
The Uniform Paternity Act does not endow a 
district court with subject matter jurisdiction 
to terminate the parent-child relationship or to 
permanently relieve a parent of his or her sup-
port obligations. Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P*2d 
1275 (Utah Ct App. 1990). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Jurisdiction. 
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PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 62A-9-121 
(3) For the purpose of providing assistance to persons subjected to ex-
traordinary problems of living, by reason of any special situation, 
monthly payments may be made within rules devised to meet those situa-
tions, such as an allowance to meet the special needs of pregnant women. 
(4) Because of the unpredictability of public assistance and medical 
benefits, the governor is authorized to supplement the annual appropria-
tion at the close of any fiscal year for medical benefits or public assis-
tance, by deficit spending in an amount not exceeding 2% of the total 
work program of federal and state funds allocated for the fiscal year; and 
the Legislature, at its next annual general session, shall appropriate any 
supplemental funds that the governor may have authorized for medical 
benefits or public assistance. 
History: C. 1953,62A-9-119, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 1, | 236; 1988, ch. 342, t 24. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Constitutionality. and not invidious discrimination in violation of 
Provision of former statute whereby larger equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amend-
femilies were paid disproportionately smaller tnent of United States Constitution. Utah Wel-
percentage of actual need than smaller fami- fare Rights Org. v. Lindsay, 315 F. Supp. 294 
lies was consistent with the Social Security Act (D. Utah 1970). 
62A-9-120. Calculation of General Assistance Grants. 
Grants for General Assistance made pursuant to Subsections 62A-9-114(2) 
and (3), to the extent that those payments are made on an ongoing basis for 
persons who are unemployable, shall be calculated in a manner analogous to 
that provided in Subsections 62A-9-119(l), (2), and (3). However, the ratable 
reduction for General Assistance may differ from that imposed on other pro-
grams. 
History: C. 1953,62A-M20, enacted by L. 
1988, ck 1, § 237; 1988, ch. 242, I 25. 
62A-9-121. Assignment of support. 
(1) The department shall accept an assignment of support from each appli-
cant or recipient regardless of whether its payment is court ordered. Any right 
to support from any other person which has accrued at the time the assign-
ment is executed or, if none is executed, at the time of application for assis-
tance, and which an applicant or recipient has in his own behalf, or in behalf 
of any other family member for whom the applicant or recipient is applying 
for or receiving assistance, passes to the department under the assignment or 
by operation of law upon the receipt of assistance by the recipient, even if the 
recipient has not executed and delivered an assignment to the department. 
(2) An assignment of support or a passing of rights by operation of law shall 
include payments ordered, decreed, or adjudged by any court within this state, 
any other state, or territory of the United States and is not in lieu of, and shall 
not supersede or alter, any other court order, decree, or judgment. 
(3) When an assignment is executed, the applicant or recipient is entitled to 
regular monthly assistance and the support paid the department is a refund. 
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DIVORCE 30-3-5 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 230, § 4 repeals authority, duties, and jurisdiction of court com-
these sections, as last amended by L. 1989, ch. missioners, effective April 23, 1990. 
104, §§ 2 to 5, providing for the appointment, 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health 
care of parties and children — Division of debts 
— Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Cus-
tody and visitation — Termination of alimony — 
Nonmeritorious petition for modification — Meri-
torious petition for modification [Effective until 
January 1, 1994]. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equita-
ble orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. 
The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the 
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental 
care insurance for the dependent children; and 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment 
of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabil-
ities and regarding the parties9 separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the dis-
tribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and neces-
sary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of 
the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically termi-
nates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage 
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if 
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ADDENDUM B: Order Compelling Intervention 
COPY 
JAN GRAHAM #1231 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
BY: Karma K. Dixon #1258 
Assistant Attorney General 
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor 
P. 0. Box 1980 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1980 
Telephone: (801)538-4660 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REYES VALENTINO CORDOVA, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 930003184CV 
JUDGE WILLIAM S. THORNE 
This matter came before the court June 28, 1993 pursuant to 
the MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO JOINDER AND REQUEST FOR HEARING 
filed by the State of Utah, Department of Human Services, Office of 
Recovery Services, the Honorable William A. Thome, presiding* The 
Department was represented by Blaine R. Ferguson, Assistant 
Attorney General• The defendant was neither personally present, 
nor represented by counsel. The Plaintiff, Child Support 
Enforcement, was represented by Stephen L. Johnston. 
The court, having heard argument of counsel, having reviewed 
the pleadings on file and being fully apprised therein, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED, 
1. The Circuit court has jurisdiction over delinquent child 
support payments. 
2. The State of Utah is a party needed for just adjudication 
and therefore unless the State waives its rights to any relief 
awarded in the present action, the State of Utah, Department of 
Human Services is joined as an involuntary plaintiff. 
3. The affidavit filed by Child Support Enforcement fails to 
meet the statutory requirements and therefore the motion for 
default judgment is denied. 
4. The Circuit court does not have jurisdiction to find the 
defendant in contempt of a judgment rendered by a district court 
and therefore the motion for a finding of contempt is denied. 
DATED this \' "~day of %± -> f ^ ^ 1993. 
WILLIAM Ar ^HORWE. 
Dl S.tri ct^ Court > Jirage 
V v
-—~ s •"-« — ' y '*. •' • *" * • > , % . . .*'• .V" 
CERTIFICATE""6F' MAILiNG,y 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and ORDER postage prepaid to 
the following: 
Stephen L. Johnston 
Attorney for Child Support Enforcement 
P.O. Box 748 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
ADDENDUM C: Decision 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT, 
STATE OF UTAH 
* 
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, * 
Plaintiff, * DECISION 
* 
VS. * 
* 
REYES VALENTINO CORDOVA, * 
Defendant. * Case No. 930003184cv 
* Judge: William A. Thorne 
On June 6, 1989, the Third District Court, Salt Lake County 
rendered a judgment against the defendant, Reyes Valentino Cordova, 
ordering him to pay child support to Cheryl E. Duran. Mr. Cordova 
has failed to make the required child support payments. Ms. Duran 
assigned to Child Support Enforcement (CSE), a private collection 
agency, her rights to specified months of the now delinquent 
support payments. 
In the present action CSE, as assignee, filed a complaint in 
the Third Circuit Court, West Valley Department against Mr. Cordova 
to recover the delinquent support payments assigned by Ms. Duran. 
CSE seeks a finding that Mr. Cordova is in contempt of the district 
court's judgment. Mr. Cordova has failed to file any pleading in 
the present action. CSE seeks a default judgment against Mr. 
Cordova for the assigned child support and the finding of contempt. 
In an effort to comply with Utah Code Ann. 5 78-45-9, CSE 
filed an affidavit stating that the assignor, Ms. Duran, did not 
receive public assistance during the period of time for which the 
assigned child support payments were due. Also pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. S 78-45-9, CSE filed a motion to add the State of Utah, 
Department of Human Services as a plaintiff to the present action. 
The State filed a memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's motion 
arguing that the circuit court does not have subject matter 
jurisdiction over the action and that therefore the court has no 
power to join the State to the present action. CSE responded to 
the State's memorandum and argued that the circuit court does have 
subject matter jurisdiction over the action. A hearing was held at 
the Third Circuit Court, West Valley Department regarding the 
joinder of the State as an additional plaintiff. Stephen L 
Johnston represented Child Support Enforcement. Jeffery C Hunt 
represented the State. 
ADEQUACY OF THE AFFIDAVIT 
The affidavit submitted by CSE does not meet the requirements 
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-9. The statute requires that an 
affidavit be submitted stating whether public assistance has been 
or is being provided.1 The affidavit submitted by CSE states only 
that the assignor did not receive public assistance during a 
certain period of time (April 1989 through March 1993). It fails 
to state whether the assignor has received public assistance before 
the specified dates or whether public assistance is currently being 
received. CSE has failed to meet the statutory requirements. 
Therefore, the motion for default judgment is denied. The matter 
may be reconsidered if an affidavit which complies with Utah Code 
Ann. S 78-45-9 is filed with the court. 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-45-9(2)(a) (1992). 
2 
CONTEMPT POWERS 
There is no Utah case law deciding whether one court may find 
an individual in contempt of another court's judgment. Several 
other states, however, have held that no such power exists.2 A 
Louisiana court of appeals stated: 
"The court which renders the order commanding the 
doing of a certain act by a person or a public body is 
alone vested with the right to determine, on a rule for 
contempt for failure to comply with the order, whether or 
not the order has been complied with, or sufficient 
reason given for failure to comply with it."3 
The general rule is that only the court which is contemned may 
punish for the contempt.4 
Although the Utah courts are silent on the issue, Utah 
statutory language supports the proposition that only the court 
contemned may punish for the contempt. Section 78-7-5 of the Utah 
Code states, "Every court has power to compel obedience to its 
judgments, orders, and process."5 The negative implication of this 
statute is that one court may not find an individual in contempt of 
another court's judgment. Section 78-32-1 through 13 also supports 
this proposition by granting contempt powers to Utah courts, but 
failing to grant any authority to find an individual in contempt of 
2
 See. In re Marriage of Yossef Alush, 527 N.E.2d 66 (111. 
App. Ct. 1988); Johnson v. Perini. 514 N.E.2d 1133 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1986); Lane v. Bradley, 339 P.2d 583 (Cal Dist. Ct. App. 1959); 
Louisiana ex rel. Connerlv v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Dist.. 9 So. 
2d 826 (La. Ct. App. 1942). 
3
 Connerlv. 9 So. 2d at 827. 
4
 Sge, 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 51 (1963). 
5
 Utah Code Ann. S 78-7-5(4) (1992) (emphasis added). 
3 
another court's judgment.6 
This reasoning is supported by strong policy issues. The 
court which renders a judgment knows best the specific history and 
special circumstances of the case. The ordering court is best 
situated to decide whether an individual has sufficiently complied 
with a judgment or whether the reasons for noncompliance are 
adequate. A court which does not know the specific history or 
special circumstances of a judgment is less well situated to decide 
the issue of contempt. Therefore# for good policy reasons 
supported by case law from other states and a reasonable reading 
and interpretation of Utah statutes, this court finds that it does 
not have jurisdiction to find contempt of a district court 
judgment. The motion for a finding of contempt is denied. 
JURISDICTION OP THE CIRCUIT COURTS 
Circuit courts have jurisdiction over civil matters involving 
less than $20,000.00 unless the jurisdiction has been removed by 
legislative action. The State of Utah, through the Attorney 
General's Office, urges this court to find that this court does not 
have jurisdiction to collect delinquent child support. 
In deciding whether child support payments are negotiable, 
Utah courts have decided that delinquent child support payments may 
be distinguished from on-going child support payments. 
6
 Utah Code Ann. §S 78-32-1 to -13 (1992). 
4 
"Support money can fall into two separate categories: 
First, the current and ongoing right of a child to 
receive support money from his father (parent); and 
second, the right to receive reimbursement for support of 
a child after that has been done."7 
The courts also state that the reimbursement for delinquent support 
payments belongs to whomever furnished the support and "is subject 
to negotiation, settlement, satisfaction or discharge in the same 
manner as any other debt."8 Circuit courts have civil jurisdiction 
over matters in which the sum claimed is less than $20,000 dollars.9 
There being no statutory prohibition to the collection of this 
debt, it may be collected in the circuit court. Assigned day care 
arrears may also be collected in the circuit court under the same 
reasoning. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide courts with the 
power to join parties to an action who are "needed for just 
adjudication."10 To decide whether a party is needed for just 
adjudication, the court considers several issues. First, the court 
decides whether the party to be joined is subject to service of 
process and whether subject matter jurisdiction is proper.11 
Second, the court decides whether complete relief can be accorded 
7
 Baqqs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141, 143 (1974). 
9
 Utah Code Ann. S 78-4-7 (1992). 
10
 Utah R. Civ. P. 19. 
u
 lOt. 
5 
in the party's absence.12 Third, the court decides whether the 
party to be joined claims an interest in the action and if so, 
whether as a practical matter the party's ability to protect its 
interest will be impaired or impeded, or leave any other party 
subject to a substantial risk of multiple or inconsistent 
obligations.13 
In the present action the State meets all the criteria of a 
party needed for just adjudication. First, they are subject to 
service of process and do not deprive the circuit court of subject 
matter jurisdiction. Second, the State by statute is assigned a 
right to delinquent child support payments when a custodial parent 
receives public assistance.14 With the State absent CSE could not 
be accorded complete relief of its own assigned rights. Third, 
from this statutory assignment, the State gains an interest in the 
present action. If the State is absent,. CSE may be awarded relief 
without regard for the State's interest which would impair and 
impede as a practical matter the State's ability to protect its 
interest. Further, the defendant, Mr. Cordova, runs a substantial 
risk of multiple or inconsistent obligations if the State is 
awarded relief in the district court and CSE is awarded relief in 
the circuit court. The State is a party needed for the just 
adjudication of the present action. Therefore, the circuit court 
13
 X<L. 
14
 Utah Code Ann. S 62A-9-121(l) 1992 
6 
may join the State in the present action as a plaintiff, defendant, 
or involuntary plaintiff .l5 
The State objects to being joined. The Department of Human 
Services appearing through the Attorney General feels adequately 
represented in the district court and for reasons of economy and 
convenience to its office does not wish to be joined. If the State 
does not wish to be joined, it may waive its right to any relief 
awarded in the present action. By so doing, it forfeits its 
interest in this action and is not needed for just adjudication. 
Otherwise, the State is a proper party and may be joined upon 
motion of the plaintiff. Therefore, unless the State waives its 
right, the State of Utah, Department of Human Services is joined as 
an additional plaintiff. 
It is therefore ordered: 
1. That the affidavit filed by Child Support Enforcement fails to 
meet the statutory requirements and therefore the motion for 
default judgment is denied. 
2. That the circuit court does not have jurisdiction to find the 
defendant in contempt of a judgment rendered by a district court 
and therefore the motion for .a finding of contempt is denied. 
3. That the circuit court has jurisdiction over delinquent child 
support payments and day care arrears, that the State is a party 
needed for just adjudication, and therefore unless the State waives 
its rights to any relief awarded in the present action, the State 
w
 id* 
7 
of Utah, Department of Human Services is joined as an additional 
plaintiff. 
DATED this / / • day of 
/ . CIRCUIT COURT JUi 
